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Summary 
Over the past decade, the Government of Tanzania has paid increasing attention to accountability 
in its nutrition policies. This has coincided with the introduction of truly innovative efforts to 
advance and monitor government action towards and accountability for nutrition at subnational 
level. A multisectoral nutrition scorecard (MNS) has been rolled out across all districts in the 
country, with quarterly updates on district performance. Moreover, a Nutrition Compact instrument 
was introduced to incentivise senior civil servants within regional and district administrations to 
advance efforts to promote nutrition. This paper explores how the government has used these 
initiatives to give accountability a particular form and meaning, pertinent to context. The paper 
analyses a series of policy documents and complements this analysis with field-based interviews with 
local officials across five regions. We find that the MNS and Compact are designed 
predominantly for internal purposes of government. This renders ‘accountability tools’ largely in 
the service of a centralised state, advancing vertical accountability. Such a narrow framing and 
design inhibits the potential of these instruments for galvanising social accountability, whereby 
citizens can hold public service providers and subnational government actors to account directly. 
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Nutrition in Tanzania remains a critical issue. Over the past decade, progress on 
key indicators such as stunting has been good, but needs to be accelerated, as 
overall levels remain high: nearly one in three children under five remain stunted1 
(Government of Tanzania 2019a). Conversely, progress made in the 2000s 
towards reducing the high incidence of maternal anaemia has seen some recent 
reverses, and a growing share of the population is overweight and obese 
(Headey et al. 2019). 
In the past few years, the Government of Tanzania has expended a significant 
amount of political commitment and energy directed at governance innovations 
with a substantial promise to accelerate nutrition improvements. In many ways, 
Tanzania appears to be a key contemporary innovator regarding nutrition 
governance; and it is no coincidence that other African governments, such as 
Kenya, are actively seeking to learn from Tanzania’s experience.2 Highly 
coordinated multisectoral governance mechanisms have been initiated at 
national, regional, and district levels. Policy and programme delivery 
mechanisms at the subnational level have been gradually strengthened and 
vertical coordination fostered. The government has: put in place dedicated 
nutrition officers in all districts; created a separate budget line for nutrition across 
all layers of government to facilitate greater spending transparency; 
institutionalised annual multisectoral strategic policy review processes; and 
initiated performance contracts making subnational-level officials personally 
more accountable for progress on nutrition in their territories. 
Furthermore, Tanzania has introduced innovative scorecard instruments that 
seek to provide highly organised, regular data updates on nutrition-specific and 
nutrition-sensitive activities, outputs, and outcomes at subnational level. 
Accordingly, the government has also put in place (since 2015 and with the 
support of UNICEF) a multisectoral nutrition scorecard (MNS) that aims to 
strengthen accountability by measuring efforts to improve nutrition outcomes at 
the district level. The MNS, which has been rolled out across all 125 districts, is 
designed to work alongside an overarching Common Results, Resources and 
Accountability Framework (CRRAF), which was developed around the same 
time. Moreover, in 2018, the Tanzanian Minister of State in the President’s Office 
– Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG), on behalf of then 
vice president (and now president) Samia Suluhu Hassan, signed a Nutrition 
Compact with all 26 regional commissioners to introduce a new approach to 
 
1  On another key indicator – the prevalence of wasting among children under five – the country saw a 
decrease from 3.8 per cent in 2014 to 3.5 per cent in 2018 (Government of Tanzania 2019a: 98). 
2  Tanzanian policy consultant (pers. comm. 2019). 
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oversee the implementation of nutrition interventions at subnational level. The 
Nutrition Compact (henceforth referred to as the Compact) is a contract that 
measures the performance of regions on a set of nutrition-specific indicators and 
disbursement of nutrition-related funds, using a scorecard approach similar to 
the MNS. As of 2019, the Compact was further cascaded down to district level, 
covering all 184 councils. 
The global academic literature on scorecards used at subnational levels provides 
some evidence that they can have positive effects on accountability, by 
strengthening communication between stakeholders, increasing citizen 
engagement and advocacy efforts, and empowering citizens, service providers, 
and public officials to hold decision makers to account (Hilber et al. 2016; Blake 
et al. 2016; ten Hoope-Bender et al. 2016). Whether this may also be the case 
for nutrition in Tanzania is not currently clear, as information and evidence on 
policymakers’ vision on accountability and the actual functioning of the 
scorecards is dispersed, and access constrained. Moreover, in the past few 
years, under the presidency of the late John Magufuli, Tanzania witnessed a 
clear descent into authoritarianism, with the space for civil society and academic 
critique of government being significantly curtailed. 
This report attempts to piece together policymakers’ visions for the MNS and the 
Compact at subnational level, and how these instruments are being used, to 
assess their implications for nutrition accountability, and to inform a wide range 
of actions by local, national, and international stakeholders.  
To that end, the report addresses three research questions: 
1. Why did the CRRAF, MNS and Compact emerge, what are their respective 
visions on nutrition accountability, and how is this expressed in the design of 
the scorecards and accompanying monitoring mechanisms? 
2. What is the current access to and use of the MNS and Compact at the 
subnational level in Tanzania? 
3. How are communities, civil society and development partners employing the 
MNS and Compact to help foster nutrition accountability?  
Our analysis seeks to elucidate the relations between the MNS and the 
Compact, given the not inconsiderable current confusion about this, as a 
prospective first step to future analyses of how these instruments reshape 
subnational contestations for nutrition resources, processes, and outcomes 
between key stakeholders such as communities, officials, elected political 
leaders, civil society groups, and development partners. 
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This study commenced in 2020, and as a result of the global Covid-19 
pandemic, partners from the United Kingdom (UK) were unable to visit Tanzania 
to jointly conduct fieldwork, interviews, and workshops with Tanzanian partners. 
Consequently, contributions pivoted towards a distanced, more desk-based 
approach.  
In the initial stages of the study, efforts were made to obtain minutes of meetings 
of the district steering committee on nutrition (DSCN). Partners had hoped to 
learn about the vision expressed on nutrition accountability in nutrition meetings 
at lower levels of government, and the extent to which tools such as the MNS 
and Compact are employed at district, ward, and village levels. With the support 
of the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC), we obtained a set of DSCN 
meeting minutes, and began translating these from Kiswahili into English. It 
quickly became clear that the transcripts of the minutes were of little use to our 
research. The minutes largely consisted of attendance records, with some 
mention of agenda items. If there were any substantive discussions by 
committee members about the MNS or the Compact scorecards and their data, 
none were recorded, apparently reflecting prevailing minuting practice in local 
government meetings.  
Forced to abandon our initial approach, we turned to two research methods that 
together helped us answer the research questions on nutrition accountability in 
Tanzania. These were: (1) a detailed look into policy using a scoping study of 
national nutrition documents; and (2) interactions with key stakeholders 
concerned with nutrition at lower government levels using a series of field 
interviews. This was made possible, as Tanzanian partners felt able to undertake 
fieldwork in November and December 2020. 
To answer the first research question on the vision, evolution, and purpose of the 
accountability mechanisms in Tanzanian nutrition policies, this report analyses 
several national nutrition policies and policy evaluation reports published since 
2010. These documents include the following. 
‒ National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) 2011–12 to 2015–16: Tanzania’s principal 
national approach for nutrition implementation that was used in the five-year 
period between 2011 and 2016. 
‒ National Multisectoral Nutrition Action Plan (NMNAP) 2016–21: Tanzania’s 
nutrition strategy that replaced the NNS for the subsequent five years. 
‒ NMNAP Mid-Term Review 2019: Report on the progress of NMNAP’s 
objectives, published three years after it began implementation. 
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‒ Joint Multisectoral Nutrition Reviews (JMNRs): Annual reviews conducted by 
the Prime Minister’s Office to review operational progress, challenges, and 
opportunities, which also recommends ways forward in nutrition matters. 
These reviews began in 2014 and were conducted every year until 2019. This 
report includes information from all six JMNRs published so far. 
‒ Evaluation meeting reports on the implementation of the Nutrition Compact: 
These biannual and annual reports summarise the evaluation meetings held 
by PO-RALG to oversee the implementation of the Compact. We have 
analysed all Compact evaluation reports except the first one (published in 
August 2018), which was unobtainable. 
We also benefited from being able to review several slide decks presented by 
government officials, and were able to draw on insights of local partners at the 
Sokoine University of Agriculture (John Msuya) and from Tumaini Mikindo, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Partnership on Nutrition in Tanzania (PANITA), a 
federation of local civil society organisations working on nutrition. To facilitate 
fieldwork on the second research question, Professor Msuya consulted senior 
officials in the PO-RALG who helped to secure government permission for the 
study, and facilitated access to officials in district councils. Further, in order to 
clarify matters regarding details of some policy implementation, we sought and 
received inputs from two key informants responsible for the data collection 
systems at TFNC and PO-RALG.  
For the second research question, on how the MNS and Compact are being 
used at lower levels of government, we interviewed 204 officials in five districts 
located in five regions: Kigoma (in Kigoma region); Kishapu (in Shinyanga 
region); Mbeya (in Mbeya region); Misungwi (in Mwanza region); and Morogoro 
(in Morogoro region). These interviews were conducted by a team of research 
assistants with a nutrition background from Sokoine University of Agriculture 
during November and December 2020. Respondents included members of the 
development committees at three administrative levels: the district, ward, and 
village. At the district level, respondents represented at least half the district 
committee; although a majority were government officials, we also interviewed 
other committee members such as representatives of religious groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). The government has decided not to create 
new multi-stakeholder platforms below the district level, instead promoting 
nutrition dialogue within existing ward development committees and village 
councils, as these comprise members from government, civil society groups, 
faith-based organisations, and the private sector. Within each selected district, 
two wards were chosen – one close to the district council headquarters and one 
further away. Within each selected ward, two villages were chosen, and their 
development committee members selected for interview. 
The five regions were selected to provide a general picture of the country, as 
nutrition statuses vary significantly across each region. There were also other 
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compelling reasons for selecting particular district councils within each region. 
For instance, Morogoro and Kigoma were involved in earlier fieldwork on 
subnational nutrition scorecards by team members (te Lintelo 2019), while 
Mbeya – unlike the former two regions – has been receiving substantial nutrition 
support from UNICEF for a number of years. Upon request of the funder, we 
included Misungwi (which has received nutrition support from Irish Aid for a few 
years now), while Kishapu was specifically recommended by PO-RALG because 
it has the worst performance on nutrition within the Lake Zone. 
At the time of setting the structured interview questionnaire, both the MNS and 
the Compact appeared to serve a synonymous purpose, and detailed differences 
in their mandate or scope were neither published nor fully clear to the research 
team. As initial consultations with nutrition professionals and government officials 
engaged in nutrition policy and planning at the national level in Tanzania also did 
not generate full clarity, we framed interview questions broadly and asked 
respondents to reflect on the MNS and/or the Compact. 
Importantly, field research showed that very few respondents were able to 
distinguish between the MNS and the Compact. Indeed, it took an in-depth 
analysis of the nutrition policy documents to identify some of the finer differences 
between the two instruments (elaborated in section 3), yet even so, not to a fully 
satisfactory standard. 
The research team also encountered some difficulties during the process of 
conducting the interviews. In a couple of districts, interviewers interacted with 
government officials immediately after ward or village council meetings, since 
that allowed access to a wider set of respondents. In such cases, it was possible 
that the respondents, who were sitting close to one another, overheard answers 
given by their colleagues in the council, resulting in our recording similar or 
identical sets of responses for multiple questions in those instances. There were 
also some differences in how respondents from the different districts interpreted 
some of the questions, possibly reflecting the diverse composition of the team of 
research assistants, despite careful prior instruction by the local team lead. As 
expected, the number and kind of respondents interviewed in each district varied 
slightly depending on local availability. Accordingly, a generally similar (but not 
fully uniform) approach was taken towards conducting the interviews across all 
sites. Nevertheless, given the overall trends observed from each district after our 
analysis, we are confident in the validity of the data for addressing the aim and 
scope of this study. 
The complete set of questions posed in the field interviews is available in Annexe 
2A. The responses to these questions were interpreted through a thematic 
coding process in the qualitative data coding software NVivo. Once the broad 
themes had emerged, they were jointly analysed, and the takeaways of this 
analysis are presented in section 4. 
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3. Vision on nutrition accountability 
expressed in policy documents 
This section lays out the Tanzanian government’s vision on nutrition 
accountability expressed in national policies and reports over the previous 
decade. To that end, we review two five-year nutrition strategies from 2011 to 
2021, annual nutrition reviews from 2014 to 2019, and other relevant materials to 
analyse the genesis and evolution of three specific frameworks and tools related 
to nutrition accountability. We then discuss the nature of this accountability as 
observed in these documents, and then finally touch on the role of development 
and non-governmental partners in this space in Tanzania. 
Before we begin, and to set our discussion of nutrition policy documents in 
context, Figure 3.1 provides a timeline of policy decisions and key documents 
reviewed to distil the relations between the CRRAF, the MNS, and the Compact. 
3.1 Common results, action plans, and 
multisectoral nutrition scorecard 
Recognition of the need to build accountability mechanisms in nutrition came 
about through a gradual process over the previous decade. The National 
Nutrition Strategy (NNS), which outlined Tanzania’s ambitions to implement 
nutrition-related programmes from 2011–12 to 2015–16, mentioned ‘enhancing 
public accountability’ as a goal that could be achieved through effective 
research, monitoring, and evaluation activities. There was little explanation of 
what the term ‘accountability’ meant in the context of nutrition governance, but 
the NNS gave a preview of what would turn out to be an important component of 
nutrition reviews and policies published in subsequent years. Stimulated by the 
emergence of the global Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, in 2013 
President Jakaya Kikwete3 declared Tanzania an ‘early riser country’, to join its 
international SUN lead group, and to issue a Presidential Call for Action on 
Nutrition (Government of Tanzania 2013). The SUN movement, comprising all 
main development partners,4 provided substantial technical and financial 
assistance to the Government of Tanzania in the following decade, to underline 
 
3  Former Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete is still a member of the SUN lead group. However, he 
works there in an individual capacity, and not as a country representative. 
4  While the NNS in 2011 recognised the financial and technical support of only one such partner, 
UNICEF, the list steadily grew in acknowledgement sections of all subsequent government publications 
on nutrition throughout the decade. Notably, this increase in both financial and non-financial assistance 
in nutrition programmes from non-state actors coincided with a growing need to hold the state and 
stakeholders internally accountable for results and resources. JMNR 2018 recognised financial help 
from at least ten development organisations. 
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the necessity of greater multisectoral coordination within government and with 
the non-governmental and private sectors. Its discourse of scaling up nutrition is 
significantly reflected in the NMNAP, which is 60 per cent funded by 
development partners, with government providing 30 per cent and the private 
sector 10 per cent (Government of Tanzania 2016a: 6). 
























Source: Authors’ own. 
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With this new impetus towards horizontal and vertical coordination, the final 
years of the NNS saw the publication of Joint Multisectoral Nutrition Reviews 
(JMNRs) under the aegis of the Prime Minister’s Office. These annual reviews 
entailed a large gathering of stakeholders in Dar es Salaam (and later in 
Dodoma) from across administrative sectors and layers, as well as development 
partners and civil society groups, to jointly assess progress towards nutrition 
outcomes. The first JMNR was published in 2014, with the objective of reviewing 
the first three years of the NNS. One of its main recommendations was to 
develop a Common Results, Resources and Accountability Framework (CRRAF) 
to track the progress of the NNS. The lack of such a framework, the document 
notes, ‘makes it difficult to monitor and evaluate on the basis of results’ 
(Government of Tanzania 2014: 14). Although introduced primarily to align the 
goals and resources of the government’s nutrition-related schemes, CRRAF was 
proposed in JMNR 2014 as a solution to challenges such as the lack of a 
monitoring and evaluation framework (ibid.). To the best of our knowledge, this 
was the first time such a framework had been proposed (and subsequently 
implemented) in national nutrition policy globally. 
The Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre (TFNC) was tasked with developing the 
CRRAF by mid-2015. Although group discussions in JMNR 2014 recommended 
that the CRRAF include ‘outcome and process indicators, the estimated 
resources (human and financial) to achieve agreed results and the time frame’, 
the actual details of the framework were not made public until a couple of years 
later (Government of Tanzania 2014: 30). Instead, CRRAF continued to feature 
in the list of recommendations of the next annual review, JMNR 2015, where the 
framework was shown to be an important component of the upcoming National 
Multisectoral Nutrition Action Plan (NMNAP) – the central nutrition policy to 
inherit the baton from the NNS for the period 2015–16 until 2020–21. The Prime 
Minister’s Office, in addition to the TFNC, was now to oversee the development 
of the CRRAF (Government of Tanzania 2015: 9). 
Interestingly, although the CRRAF is seen as a significant part of the imminent 
NMNAP in JMNR 2015, it was yet to be written about as a definite tool or even 
as an acronym, unlike how the JMNRs of subsequent years talk about the 
CRRAF. This suggests that there was little progress on developing the 
framework at this stage. JMNR 2015 introduced another tool that would later add 
to Tanzania’s mix of nutrition-specific accountability mechanisms – the 
multisectoral nutrition scorecard (MNS). Even with little detail on the structure, 
scope, and use of the scorecard in JMNR 2015, two similarities emerged 
between the CRRAF and the MNS: (1) both were to be included in the upcoming 
NMNAP strategy; and (2) they were to be developed together by the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the TFNC (ibid.). 
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The picture gets a lot clearer with the publication of JMNR 2016. Taking place 
around the same time that the NMNAP was drafted, the TFNC clarified that 
‘while the CRRAF combines results, resources and accountability from all 
stakeholders to achieve synergies for the One Desired NMNAP Outcome, the 
scorecard is the tool for monitoring the outputs of the NMNAP’ (Government of 
Tanzania 2016b: 22). The CRRAF and the MNS are designed to be the primary 
reference tools of the government during meetings of the High-Level Steering 
Committee on Nutrition, the Multisectoral Nutrition Technical Working Group 
(MNTWG), and regional and district steering committees on nutrition, as the 
TFNC explained (Government of Tanzania 2016b: 24). Both the High-Level 
Steering Committee and the Technical Working Group featured substantial 
participation by development partners.  
The CRRAF has seven outcomes, each of which includes several outputs, 
which in turn delegate duties to departments and organisations to achieve the 
targets, allocate budgets, and define indicators to measure progress. These 
seven outcomes correspond to the seven ‘key result areas’ of the NMNAP (see 
Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Relationship between the National 
Multisectoral Nutrition Action Plan key result 
areas and the Common Results, Resources and 
Accountability Framework outcomes 
NMNAP CRRAF  






Scaling up maternal, 





Increased proportion of adolescents, 
pregnant women and mothers / 
caregivers of children under two 
years who practice optimal 




Scaling up prevention 





Children, adolescents and women of 




Scaling up integrated 




Increased coverage of integrated 
management of severe and 
moderate acute malnutrition  
(Cont’d.) 
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Table 3.1 (cont’d.) 
NMNAP CRRAF  






Scaling up prevention 






Communities in Tanzania are 









Line sectors, private sector and civil 
society organisations scale up 
nutrition-sensitive interventions to 















information system  
Outcome 
7 
Quality nutrition-related information 
is accessible and used to allow 
government and partners to make 
timely and effective evidence-
informed decisions 
Source: Authors’ own. 
The CRRAF was hence defined as a framework to bring in – and facilitate the 
synergy between – several actors and sectors working towards a set of common 
results. It outlined a pathway including outputs, outcomes, and impacts deemed 
necessary to achieve those common results. The framework also explicitly lists 
the accountable institutions – which include government ministries, departments, 
agencies, NGOs, and private sector bodies – and the resources needed to 
achieve each output. 
Moreover, the framework facilitates regular tracking of progress using pre-
defined targets for disbursement of funds and achievement of the outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. One attribute of the CRRAF emphasised by JMNR 2016 
is that the tool does not require additional funding or resources for its 
implementation because it merely makes a nutrition-focused framework out of 
pre-existing targets for various sectors (Government of Tanzania 2016b: 23). 
Indicators, resources, and funding requirements mentioned in the CRRAF’s 
objectives are borrowed from the existing Five-Year Development Plan II and 
sectoral plans, which also makes it simpler to track progress. Even though JMNR 
2016 does not go into the detailed structure of the framework, it confirms that the 
CRRAF is primarily about fostering coordination across multiple nutrition-specific 
and nutrition-sensitive sectors. It also brings to the fore what each contributor 
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offers, while seeking to advance mutual transparency and horizontal 
accountability between key actors. 
JMNR 2016 describes the MNS as a web-based tool for quarterly tracking of 
performance on indicators and targets associated with the NMNAP (Government 
of Tanzania 2016b: 23). The MNS adopts a traffic-light system wherein indicator 
performances of districts and subsequently regions are measured against pre-
defined threshold values. The scorecard is based on information provided by 
‘nutrition officers in the councils and regions, in collaboration with officers from 
nutrition sensitive sectors and Health Management Information System (HMIS) 
coordinators’, who fill in output-level indicators, while outcome and impact 
indicators of the NMNAP are informed by nationwide surveys and studies 
(Government of Tanzania 2016b: 23).  
The MNS too has been defined as an accountability tool, which will regularly 
feed into the CRRAF to allow for tracking of nutrition interventions and aid 
decision-making (Government of Tanzania 2016b: 24). Initiated by the TFNC 
and supported by UNICEF, the intended uses of the MNS (according to the 
TFNC’s inputs in JMNR 2016) are limited to helping the government track the 
impact of the NMNAP, helping nutrition officers prioritise actions based on 
evidence, and facilitating decision-making in the nutrition sector. 
In summary, JMNR 2016 shows that the CRRAF and the MNS are ‘two powerful 
tools’ within the NMNAP that have been designed to aid the implementation of 
nutrition interventions in a few specific ways (Government of Tanzania 2016b: 
24). They: (1) bring relevant sectors together around concrete interventions, 
results, and funding commitments; (2) provide evidence for decision-making and 
action, including budget allocation; and (3) generate accountability towards the 
achievement of results and compliance with financial commitments (i.e. 
budgetary allocations) (ibid.). However, they essentially differ in purpose and 
scale: while the CRRAF coordinates inputs or what goes in (i.e. aligning 
sectoral goals and resources to aim for common results and setting stakeholders 
responsible for action at the national level), the MNS monitors outputs or what 
comes out (tracking progress of the NMNAP on all those output areas at district 
levels, which is then aggregated at the regional and national levels). The CRRAF 
therefore presents a framework that offers greater mutual transparency in terms 
of the type and level of contributions made by different sectors (from agriculture 
to social protection, to health and nutrition), and thus offers a measure of 
‘horizontal’ accountability at the national level. It demands few sacrifices from, 
but fosters cohesion in, the joint effort of contributing parties towards better 
nutrition in Tanzania. In contrast, the MNS is a centralising mechanism that 
renders more visible to higher authorities the nutrition-related actions and failures 
of lower administrative authorities. While the ‘vertical’ structure of accountability 
relations are not altered, the MNS changes this relation by imposing on 
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subnational authorities the requirement to produce, and be accountable for, 
quarterly data on nutrition efforts and outcomes, in the light of policy goals. 
3.2 The Compact 
In August 2017, during the National Food Fortification Summit, then vice 
president (and now president) Samia Suluhu Hassan gave directives to 
constitute a nutrition performance agreement with all 26 regional commissioners 
of the Tanzania mainland to oversee the implementation of nutrition activities in 
the regions (Government of Tanzania 2019b: 3). Three months later, the minister 
of state for PO-RALG, on behalf of the vice president, signed the Nutrition 
Performance Compact Agreement for Nutrition Intervention Implementation with 
all the regional commissioners. The Compact agreement came into effect in 
January 2018. 
Although the original Compact is not publicly available for inclusion in this study, 
we draw on the reports of evaluation meetings that have been taking place since 
2018. 
Much like the CRRAF and MNS, formulation of a nutrition monitoring mechanism 
at the level of local government authorities (LGAs) and regional secretariats 
(RSs) was hinted at before the Compact actually came into being. Among the 
recommendations of JMNR 2016, PO-RALG was given the task to ‘review and 
harmonise supervision tools for multisectoral nutrition activities’ for RSs and 
LGAs by the next year (Government of Tanzania 2016b: 7). In the subsequent 
review (JMNR 2017), the deputy minister of PO-RALG reiterated his 
department’s commitment towards NMNAP implementation, and revealed a 
focus on coordinating nutrition-related actions taken by regions and councils. He 
said that a ‘performance contract’ with regional commissioners was being drafted 
on the instructions of then vice president Hassan to ensure regular follow-ups, 
monitoring and management of nutrition interventions in areas under PO-RALG’s 
jurisdiction (Government of Tanzania 2017: 18). 
JMNR 2018 is the first annual review to mention the Compact by name. In an 
update on the implementation status of JMNR 2017’s recommendations, the 
Compact is shown to be a response to the third recommendation, which read, 
‘To strengthen incentive mechanisms for LGA and RS to enhance accountability 
in domestic resources utilisation and performance – Lead by PO-RALG’ 
(Government of Tanzania 2018: 20). The review’s update to this 
recommendation informs that the Compact was introduced as a contract 
between PO-RALG and regional commissioners, which specified ‘indicators to 
which all local and regional authorities are accountable’ (ibid.). 
The Compact thus offers an important new mechanism to allow central 
government to hold lower levels of government (under the PO-RALG’s 
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jurisdiction) to account for effective use of domestic resources to meet nutrition 
spending (and, indirectly, output, outcome and impact) targets set by national 
policies. This understanding is reflected in several instances within JMNRs 2018 
and 2019, including a statement by the UNICEF deputy country representative, 
who applauded the signing of the Compact as a means ‘to oversee 
implementation of the NMNAP in every region, in terms of funds disbursed for 
nutrition interventions and results achieved’ (Government of Tanzania 2018: 81). 
The Compact’s focus has much in common with the NMNAP and its tools 
(evident from a comparison of indicators, as shown later in this report), but its 
audience and method to achieve those targets are unique. In the Tanzanian 
system of public administration, presidential appointees – the regional and 
district commissioners – represent the president locally. They are often the most 
powerful actors at the local level, and their voice carries greater weight than that 
of the most senior bureaucrats, the district executive directors. The Compact, as 
an experimental initiative, thus also presents a mechanism that strengthens 
centralised administrative oversight and control by the vice president and 
president over these appointees. Since the Compact is a PO-RALG tool, it 
addresses the section of government departments that are under PO-RALG’s 
jurisdiction: regional administration and local government bodies. The Compact 
operates entirely through these channels to achieve its objectives, and this 
operational structure is evident in the summaries of the Compact evaluation 
meeting reports. For instance, in the second evaluation meeting of the Compact, 
the minister of state for PO-RALG challenged the 31 councils that did not 
disburse funds for the implementation of nutrition activities between July and 
December 2018, asking the regional commissioners heading those councils for 
explanations (Government of Tanzania 2019c: 6). On the other hand, regions 
are also congratulated for good performance, with Kilimanjaro, Njombe, and 
Iringa recognised for ‘outstanding performance in implementation of Nutrition 
Compact’ in the third evaluation meeting (Government of Tanzania 2019b: 17–
19). Annexe 1A provides further examples of this. The Compact, through its 
generation of competitive dynamics between regions and districts, thus appears 
to create incentives to demonstrate progress in action on nutrition. Although 
there is a lack of evidence on whether such competition drives accelerated 
reduction of malnutrition, it is clear that the Compact seeks to support 
implementation of the national policy at the subnational level. 
The Compact may, however, also be viewed as strengthening political oversight 
and control by the (vice) presidency. The president is also the chief of the 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) political party, which has reigned Tanzania since 
post-independence in 1964. Regional and district commissioners are typically 
party loyalists, some of whom will harbour political career aspirations (Hoffman 
2013). The Compact thus offers not only an administrative instrument but also a 
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party political tool that can be used to shore up intra-party coalitions and loyalty 
to its local, regional, and national party leadership.  
Although the Compact had not been developed when the NMNAP commenced 
as Tanzania’s primary nutrition policy in 2016, it has since evolved to be a key 
accountability tool under the NMNAP. By 2019, NMNAP’s Mid-Term Review 
noted that all 25 regions and 184 district councils of Tanzania had implemented 
the Compact, and the focus was now on ensuring ward leaders’ oversight of its 
implementation at ward levels (Government of Tanzania 2019d: 59). The review, 
conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office, praised the Compact’s progress, and 
acknowledged its role in the ‘significant progress made in increasing ownership, 
commitment and accountability of regional and district commissioners to nutrition 
and specifically to NMNAP implementation’ (ibid.). 
Accordingly, the 2019 Mid-Term Review recognised the role of the Compact in a 
range of NMNAP elements, including: (1) aligning efforts at regional and district 
levels to national nutrition objectives, thereby elevating awareness and 
understanding of nutrition actions among local leaders; (2) as a key component 
of NMNAP’s sixthth key result area, which dealt with establishing efficient and 
effective nutrition governance; (3) as a key component of NMNAP’s seventhth 
key result area, where it appeared as a tool for monitoring and evaluation; (4) as 
a part of ‘advocacy and social mobilisation’, which is one of NMNAP’s ten 
strategies to achieve its objectives; and (5) as NMNAP’s primary tool to track and 
improve budgetary allowances and disbursement of nutrition funds at regional 
and district levels. 
Along with other existing mechanisms, the Compact is now an important 
component of the revised CRRAF (Government of Tanzania 2019d: 91–120); it 
repeatedly appears as a source of information for outputs under CRRAF 
outcomes 1, 6, and 7. The Compact is also listed in the Mid-Term Review among 
the evidence-based mechanisms to track overall and continuous progress of the 
NMNAP, along with JMNRs, bottleneck analyses,5 the MNS, annual workplans, 
and development of the Multisectoral Nutrition Information System (MNIS) 
(Government of Tanzania 2019d: 62). Given the extent of the Compact’s 
applications, the review recommends an increase in its scope in the second 
phase of NMNAP implementation, post-2021. 
 
5  Bottleneck analyses have been carried out in multiple stages to look at areas within the processes of 
delivery of nutrition interventions that inhibit the workflow. For instance, in 2015–16, bottleneck analyses 
were conducted at LGA level to ‘systematically assess the main determinants of effective coverage of 
the selected nutrition interventions in order to design evidence-based strategies for scaling-up’ 
(Government of Tanzania 2016b: 12). 
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3.3 Nutrition data management across ministries 
and administrations 
The NMNAP document of 2016 laid the foundation for the establishment of the 
MNIS, the objective of which was to ‘ensure better quality and more timely 
collection and dissemination of outcomes (and programme performance) data for 
evidence informed advocacy, communication and adaptive management of the 
NMNAP’ (Government of Tanzania 2016a: 83). The MNIS was designed to 
centrally collate nutrition-related data from sectoral information systems already 
in use by different ministries. For the first time, it sought to integrate information 
systems that regularly collected data on nutrition lodged in a range of ministries, 
such as the Food Security Information System, the Health Management 
Information System, the Education Information Management System, and the 
Tanzania Commission for AIDS information system, among others. 
The MNIS drew inspiration from other efforts to systematically collate data from a 
range of sources, including large-scale national surveys such as the Tanzania 
Demographic and Health Survey, the STEPS6 survey, the Nutrition Public 
Expenditure Review, and the National Nutrition Survey. Nutrition survey data 
were typically generated every 4–5 years, making them more useful for long-
term policy and strategy development than for tracking operational progress or 
assessing bottlenecks in the delivery of interventions (Government of Tanzania 
2016a: 100). 
Another advantage of the MNIS was that it would bring together data from all 
administrative levels. National nutrition surveys and reports were designed to be 
‘statistically representative only at the regional and national levels’ and thus did 
not contain data specific to district, council, ward, and village levels. The NMNAP 
also recommended that the TFNC be provided with resources and training to 
function as the single institution to streamline the process of establishing the 
MNIS, and set out its vision as follows: 
The full potential of a nutrition information system can be harnessed 
if the system covers all administrative levels, from national to council 
and community levels; if the data can be analysed quickly and used 
at the point of collection and if the timeliness and quality of the 
information collected is robust. 
(Government of Tanzania 2016a: 100) 
 
6  The STEPwise Approach to NCD Risk Factor Surveillance (STEPS) is ‘a simple, standardized method 
for collecting, analysing and disseminating data on key NCD risk factors in countries’ (WHO n.d.). NCD, 
here, refers to noncommunicable diseases. 
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The MNS and the Compact, along with other nutrition surveys and information 
systems, thus contribute subnational level data to the new MNIS, from districts 
and regions and at short time intervals (quarterly and biannually). 
Figure 3.2 shows how the MNIS functions to collate data in a single platform. 
This schematic diagram is an indicative illustration of how the MNIS is structured; 
it may not comprehensively represent all of its components. 
Figure 3.2 Components of the Multisectoral 
Nutrition Information System 
Source: Authors’ own. 
Note: PlanRep (Planning and Reporting System), NSMIS (National Sanitation Management Information 
System) DHIS2 (District Health Information System 2), ARDS (Agricultural Routine Data System). 
 
When the Compact began in 2018, the MNIS was still being developed and was 
not yet functional. Consequently, PO-RALG (which oversees the implementation 
of the Compact) adopted a web-based system, called the Integrated Monitoring 
and Evaluation System (iMES), to generate Compact scorecards. As explained 
in the third evaluation meeting report: 
The integration of Nutrition Compact into iMES was to echo the need 
for a simplified and systemised way to conduct Compact 
performance analysis. This system reduces manual work during data 
analysis and it also allows Regions and Councils to produce their 
own scorecard based on their performances. 
(Government of Tanzania 2019b: 4)  
    
   
       
                               
             
         
               
 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper 
Nutrition Accountability through Sub-National Scorecards in Tanzania – Policy Innovations 





Once the MNIS is fully functional, the iMES containing Compact scorecards will 
feed nutrition information directly into the MNIS – a process that was set to begin 
in mid-2021 but had not yet begun by the time this report was written (November 
2021). 
Similarly, it appears that the MNS – itself collated using a web-based interface 
through inputs from local officials at district and regional levels – feeds directly 
into the MNIS. The MNS makes it possible to assess districts’ progress on 
NMNAP implementation, enabling the TFNC to establish trends in this respect, 
and to provide training and capacity-building to subnational governments.  
3.3.1 Coexistence of the MNS and the Compact in the MNIS 
Key informants noted that efforts are made to ensure that there is no overlap or 
duplication of information, and that data from both the MNS and the Compact co-
exist under the MNIS. 
This research attempted to obtain detailed operationalisations for both the 
Compact and MNS indicators. To this end, we carefully reviewed policy 
documents and evaluations available in the public domain, and consulted two 
key informants in the TFNC and PO-RALG. These efforts have resulted in a 
partial overview, as information was patchy, missing or simply not (made) 
available, which raises several questions with regards to nutrition accountability. 
Findings show that the MNS has 15 ‘process indicators’ spread across 10 
nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive categories, which align directly with the 
key result areas of the NMNAP. The Compact began with 11 indicators when the 
contract was initially signed between PO-RALG and the 26 regional 
commissioners in December 2017, according to the evaluation meeting reports. 
However, none of these reports (that were available for review) show information 
for 11 indicators; the second and third evaluation reports include 10 indicators, 
while the fourth report and the February 2020 regional evaluation show 9 
indicators. Since the fourth evaluation meeting (which took place in January 
2021) is the most recent, its corresponding report will be used here to study the 
Compact indicators. 
Figure 3.3 shows areas of overlap between the Compact and MNS indicators, 
and areas of difference. The nutrition-specific indicators that appear to be largely 
in common are shown in the centre of the Venn diagram. The figure also shows 
that the Compact does not share the nutrition-sensitive focus of the MNS. 
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Figure 3.3 The overlap in indicators between the 
MNS and the Compact 
  
Source: Authors’ own.  
Note: MIYCAN (maternal, infant, young child and adolescent nutrition); DRNCD (Diet Related Non-
Communicable Diseases); NSI (nutrition-sensitive interventions); MNG (multisectoral nutrition governance). 
If the MNS and the Compact do indeed co-exist under the new MNIS, we failed 
to understand the purpose served by having two systems with significant overlap 
of indicators. It is possible that the indicators they have in common have been 
operationalised differently. A more detailed overview of the overlap of indicators 
in both tools is presented in Annexe 1B. This overview suggests that where 
indicators appear to be in common, their operationalisation, as presented in the 
government reports consulted, are imprecise, and similar but not the same. We 
attempted to gain greater clarity on this, but could not conclusively confirm how 
the indicators are operationalised despite several engagements with officials in 
the TFNC and PO-RALG. It is evident that the government is not providing full 
clarity to outside observers. It is also possible that data on highly similar but not 
identical indicators are being collated through the MNS and the Compact, which, 
if confirmed to be the case, may generate significant confusion for policymakers 
and other stakeholders about the efforts, inputs, outputs, and possible impacts 
on nutrition in the country. 
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3.4 Towards what kind of nutrition accountability? 
Having set out the genesis and the substance of the MNS and the Compact, we 
are now in a position to reflect on the particular ways in which these express a 
vision on accountability for nutrition. 
The detailed structure of the CRRAF, as set out in the NMNAP document, lists 
specific institutions and organisations as ‘accountable’ for achieving each output. 
Here, accountability is loosely used to signal which bodies have a role to play in 
activities addressing particular policy outputs, to highlight the intrinsic need for 
concerted multisectoral action towards an overarching shared goal of improving 
nutrition in Tanzania. For instance, the very first output – Output 1.1 on 
increased coverage and quality of maternal, infant, young child and adolescent 
nutrition (MIYCAN) services at the community level – names PO-RALG as the 
lead institution along with the TFNC, local government authorities, the Ministry of 
Health and Community Development, the United Nations, civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and PANITA as responsible for overseeing the work on 
that particular output (Government of Tanzania 2016a: 152). Yet, the ways in 
which an accountability relationship would function, and who can use what 
means to hold some other body to account for specific acts of commission or 
omission, remains unspecified. 
The government has given significant thought and investment towards setting up 
and institutionalising a centralised data system (the MNIS) that can support 
nutrition policymaking and monitor implementation. However, through our 
communication with professionals engaged with these processes, it was 
apparent that the government’s current focus is predominantly limited to the 
Compact. This could be for a number of reasons. First, a powerful political 
leader, the vice president (now president) personally initiated the Compact and is 
driving it forward. Second, the Compact was, from the start, a homegrown 
initiative, not a donor-driven one, so buy-in was strong. Third, the MNIS 
scorecard was the responsibility of the TFNC, a small data and capacity-building 
agency with no real clout at either national or subnational level. Finally, and by 
contrast, PO-RALG has the mandate to oversee local administrations and local 
officials.  
Compact processes are being strengthened to streamline the upward flow of 
nutrition information from village to ward to district and regional levels (as has 
been reflected in the inclusion of the Compact in the revised CRAFF; see section 
3.2). These are expected to continue well beyond the lifetime of the current 
NMNAP (which ends in 2021). The MNS, on the other hand, has not progressed 
significantly since it was established along with the publication of the NMNAP, 
and currently risks falling by the wayside as a nutrition accountability tool. 
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Over the past decade, as part of the SUN movement, development partners 
have provided all kinds of nutrition-related decision-making advice to the 
Tanzanian government, as they financed and promoted coordination of nutrition 
interventions and efforts within and across government bodies. Their financial 
and non-financial investment in the country’s nutrition actions might provide an 
incentive to know how the resources are being utilised and whether the progress 
made is on track to achieve the agreed overall targets – information that can be 
furnished promptly by the kind of accountability tools developed within these 
nutrition programmes. Yet, whereas support for the MNS provided UNICEF with 
detailed access to its data, it appears that the Compact’s iMES platform is 
freestanding from shared ownership between the government and development 
partners. 
There is significant evidence to support the conclusion that social accountability7 
is low on the government’s list of priorities. The NMNAP (Government of 
Tanzania 2016a: 82) suggests that its focus on accountability within the state 
apparatus is distinct from ‘social accountability’, which would entail civic 
engagement, and stimulating demand from the public towards the state to fulfil 
its commitments to provide quality nutrition interventions and services, and 
deliver on policy goals. In theory, such ‘short routes’ to accountability operate in 
conjunction with ‘long routes’ – i.e. through electoral processes that may hold 
politicians accountable. Typically, nutrition – unlike hunger – is rarely a topic of 
electoral significance (Berg 1973), and this is also the case in Tanzania, even 
though nutrition is not altogether absent from electoral manifestos of political 
parties (te Lintelo and Pittore 2021). 
Although the NMNAP (Government of Tanzania 2016a: 83) claims to adopt a 
particular framework for nutrition governance as set out by Haddad, Acosta and 
Fanzo (2012), it does not include its recommendation to ‘support civil society 
groups to develop social accountability mechanisms’. Where the NMNAP sets 
out a division of responsibilities among all state and other stakeholders, CSOs 
are not tasked with building social accountability. Instead, they are expected to 
undertake responsibilities such as advocating for prioritisation of nutrition in 
development plans and supporting community mobilisation around nutrition 
(Government of Tanzania 2016a: 91). Such responsibilities remain shy of 
accepting a role in holding up a critical mirror to the government. Indeed, both 
within the MNS and the Compact, the role of the community vis-à-vis the 
Tanzanian government is designed to be very limited, and at best indirect. The 
NMNAP further underlines this position, when it envisages social accountability 
as involving sporadic activities, located outside of the MNS and the Compact: 
 
7  The World Bank’s classic conceptualisation considers the complementarity between ‘short routes of 
accountability’ that entail citizens holding bureaucratic service providers to account directly for 
performance, whereas ‘long routes’ involve electoral processes holding political leaders accountable 
(Schedler 1999). 
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Social accountability mechanisms for nutrition could include the use 
of a ‘Nutrition Score Card’ at the council level and participation of 
communities in monitoring implementation of the NMNAP (e.g. 
through the TASAF [Tanzania Social Action Fund] nutrition 
community sessions). Lessons from the experiences gained in the 
use of social accountability mechanisms in Tanzania by some 
stakeholders include Care’s Community Score Card, CUAMM’s 
(Doctors with Africa-Italian NGO) Beneficiary Feedback mechanism 
and Irish Aid’s support to CSO on social accountability. Each of 
these provide potential applications of social accountability in the 
implementation of the NMNAP. 
(Government of Tanzania 2016a: 82) 
Strikingly, this quote does not reference the MNS, already designed and rolled 
out at the national level, which demonstrates that this tool is not envisaged to 
support social accountability.  
The NMNAP’s Mid-Term Review in 2019 also confirms that nothing specifically 
was done to advance the cause of social accountability. However, this review 
recognises its value and recommends that social accountability should be a 
focus in the next chapter of the NMNAP. Suggesting that a scorecard similar to 
the MNS can be considered ‘for use in the community to accelerate community 
actions for nutrition’, the Mid-Term Review recommends that social 
accountability should be taken up seriously in the nutrition policy that replaces 
the NMNAP after 2021 (Government of Tanzania 2019d: 60). Consequently, 
questions of social accountability are not off the radar, but deferred into the 
future.  
Hence, it is not surprising that despite the professionalisation of institutionalised 
monitoring mechanisms and increasing availability of data on subnational 
nutrition efforts (as synthesised in the MNS and the Compact scorecards), such 
data are not as yet publicly available on a regular basis. Summaries of some of 
these scorecards for selected districts can be found within JMNR reports, which 
use them to outline the general direction of progress of nutrition programmes in 
the country. These annual JMNR reports are difficult to procure online, and fall 
significantly short of detailing region- or district-specific situations for each 
indicator that the MNS and the Compact collect data for. None of the quarterly 
and biannually furnished scorecards under these two tools are publicly available 
either. Tellingly, the team undertaking this study was unable to obtain an up-to-
date overview of the detailed components and definitions of key criteria included 
in the MNS and the Compact.  
It is not just researchers who lack access to this information. Significantly, local 
communities whose nutrition status was considered in need of improvement face 
the same obstacles. Consequently, ordinary members of the public are not in a 
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position to evaluate progress on nutrition goals, let alone to review programmatic 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes. At best, the public is involved indirectly in 
reviewing government performance on nutrition, through the representation of 
CSOs in invited platforms such as the District Steering Committees on Nutrition 
(DSCNs). There is some suggestion that these forums can and do discuss the 
MNS. However, as DSCN meetings are not minuted in any level of detail beyond 
the listing of agenda items, there is extremely limited evidence on any such 
deliberations and how they might imply a relationship of accountability for 
nutrition efforts and outcomes.  
Moreover, as the MNS/Compact data are not officially published by the 
government, even while they may be discussed in DSCNs, ward development 
and village council meetings, they are not officially in the public domain, and 
subject to significant legal restrictions in its wider use and dissemination. Under 
the late president, John Magufuli, Tanzania witnessed a growing closure of 
political space for civil society groups and opposition political leaders critical of 
the government. The passing of the Statistics Act (2015), the Cybercrime Act 
(2015), the Online Content Regulations (2018), and Statistics Act (Amendments) 
in 2018 – the latter subsequently amended following a national and international 
outcry – encode in law vaguely defined offences that are punishable with 
minimum (potentially unlimited) jail sentences and financial penalties. CSOs 
such as PANITA point out that a combination of laws, including the National 
Security Act (Cap 47 R:E 2002) and the Statistics Act, (Cap 351 R:E 2002), the 
Access to Information Act 2016, and the Public Service Act 2002, in one way or 
another impede or undermine access to information that is held by the 
government. The chilling effects of the legal environment make CSOs that are 
officially members of these nutrition platforms fearful of sharing MNS or Compact 
scorecard data with other CSOs that they represent in those meetings. 
Moreover, it makes government officials hesitant to share data, even in instances 
where official research permission has been obtained, such as for this project.  
To conclude, both the MNS and the Compact data are used predominantly for 
internal government purposes, and continue to draw on information kept from the 
public domain. Within administrative levels, the tools appear to generate greater 
transparency and – possibly – mutual accountability between different 
departments’ contributions to improved nutrition. However, overall, the systems 
are set up chiefly to serve central government needs to monitor local government 
(and its officials), narrowly interpreting accountability as ‘vertical accountability’, 
with data primarily moving from the subnational to the national level, all the while 
being collated and synthesised. Our review of the policy documents finds little 
evidence that analysed nutrition data are designed to come back to villages, 
wards and districts the data were collected from. Moreover, if the data do come 
back, it remains unclear what thought has been given to how frequently such 
feedback is organised, in what form, and whether this seeks to drive discussions 
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about mutual responsibilities across administrative levels for nutrition inputs, 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Critically, the potential of the MNS and 
Compact scorecard data to support social accountability instruments (e.g. 
through publishing these on websites, or public noticeboards) is growing as data 
management systems are professionalising. Yet, such uses remain extremely 
constrained because Tanzania's political system concentrates political power at 
the centre, with recent autocratic political leadership unwilling to promote social 
accountability, and Tanzanian law paralysing data-sharing by CSOs and 
government officials.  
What uses, then, remain to be found for the Compact and the MNS at 
subnational level? The next section discusses bottom-up perspectives on this, 
based on interviews with local-level officials. 
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4. The MNS and the Compact at 
subnational level: empirical 
evidence from interviews 
Further to our analysis so far, which had drawn particularly on an analysis of 
government policy documents, this section presents findings from field interviews 
that were conducted to understand current access to and use of the MNS and 
the Compact at lower government levels. A total of 204 interviews were 
conducted in five districts of five regions in Tanzania, during which officials from 
across nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive sectors and at district, ward, and 
village levels (see Annexe 2B for a list of respondents) discussed their 
experiences with the content and delivery of the two accountability tools. This 
section summarises the main learning through six key takeaways derived from 
our inquiry. 
4.1 Takeaway 1: Many claimed familiarity with the 
two tools, but only at district level 
Most of the officials interviewed claimed to be familiar with either the MNS or the 
Compact: 120 respondents claimed to be familiar with the two tools, whereas 83 
respondents said they were not familiar with either of them. Unsurprisingly, the 
proportion of respondents familiar with the tools differed in all five districts. For 
instance, only 2 out of 37 respondents (5 per cent) in Misungwi district were 
unfamiliar with the tools, while 27 out of 39 respondents (almost 70 per cent) in 
Morogoro district were unfamiliar with them. 
Among all respondents in all five districts who claimed to be unfamiliar with either 
the MNS or the Compact, only a small proportion belonged to the district level; 
the rest were all ward- or village-level officials. Figure 4.1, which illustrates this 
distribution, shows that awareness of and familiarity with the two accountability 
tools declined at lower levels of government. 
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Figure 4.1 Distribution by administrative level of 
83 respondents who claimed to be unfamiliar with 










Source: Authors’ own. 
 
This lack of awareness at sub-district levels of government was highlighted in 
several of the interviews. Many respondents suggested that local officials should 
be trained and sensitised to the operational structure of the two tools to improve 
their usage, as these two quotes reflect: 
Ward and village leaders still do not understand [the] MNS and [the] 
Compact because they have not been taught. 
(District education officer) 
The greatest challenge is lack of awareness and knowledge, starting 
with the leaders down below. Hence the government should provide 
seminars and trainings about the MNS and nutrition issues generally. 
(Ward executive officer, Kishapu district) 
4.2 Takeaway 2: The tools are having several 
positive outcomes  
Those respondents who were familiar with the MNS and the Compact reported 
several positive outcomes. These include positive impacts on everyday 
administration of the government’s nutrition agenda, which respondents saw as 
consequences of the implementation of the MNS and/or the Compact. 




Those unfamiliar with the MNS and the 
Compact
District-level official Ward-level official Village-level official
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and administrative leaders. None of the respondents, however, elaborated 
further on the context or space in which they saw this increased participation 
from leaders. 
Now there is much involvement of political and administrative 
leaders, which was quite different before the MNS and the Compact 
systems were introduced. 
(Deputy district executive director) 
Similarly, a number of respondents mentioned increased ‘cooperation and 
assistance from the top levels of administration’. While their answers did not go 
into detail on the kind of cooperation and assistance extended by the top 
administrative leaders, these were offered by officials at all three levels (district, 
ward, and village), suggesting that the accountability tools are already generating 
downward cascading effects within the bureaucracy.  
Some officials reported a third positive outcome, in that the tools have started to 
address the need for better vertical and horizontal coordination between councils 
and departments. There was mention of cooperation between districts and 
wards, districts and villages, and wards and villages, while some respondents 
pointed to increased horizontal cooperation between different departments: 
The cooperation and assistance between the council and ward has 
improved as the data collected starts from the grass roots (villages) 
to the top level of administration (the district council). 
(Ward councillor, Misungwi district) 
The MNS... has enabled nutrition issues to be linked with other 
sectors, e.g. agriculture and livestock departments. 
(Ward nursing officer, Kishapu district) 
Finally, several interviewees pointed to greater participation of community 
members in nutrition activities than before (see quote), and an increased 
awareness of nutrition issues. Although this is unlikely to be a direct outcome of 
the MNS or the Compact, a perceived increase in community engagement 
around nutrition could potentially be leveraged to advance social accountability 
for nutrition.  
Currently, there is greater participation of community in nutrition 
projects than before. This helps our nutrition goal to reduce 
malnutrition. 
(Ward councillor, Mbeya district) 
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4.3 Takeaway 3: Local officials struggle to 
distinguish between the tools 
The third key takeaway from the interviews diminishes our faith in the perceived 
positive outcomes reported under takeaway 2, as a significant proportion of 
respondents who claimed to be familiar with either the MNS or the Compact 
could not distinguish them from one another, nor from other tools and 
programmes implemented by government. This was evident in answers to 
several questions, where officials alluded to factors that had little to do with either 
the MNS or the Compact. Having observed answers from across the five 
districts, we can group those respondents who claimed familiarity with the MNS 
and/or the Compact into three groups: (1) officials who mentioned specific 
aspects of the two tools, thereby objectively showing their use and knowledge of 
them; (2) officials who had a vague idea about the tools, and hence referred to 
general nutrition goals instead of elements specific to the MNS or the Compact; 
and (3) officials who had clearly confused the two tools for other instruments or 
government policies. 
This can be best illustrated by listing the answers received for any one particular 
question. Question A3, for instance, asked respondents if they had ever made 
use of the information or data from the MNS or Compact systems, and if yes, 
how. Below are the responses received from each category of respondents 
discussed in the previous paragraph. In short, these are the ways in which the 
officials claimed to have used the MNS or Compact data: 
a. Answers from those who accurately pointed to features and functions 
of the MNS and the Compact: 
i. Collects information on the indicators within the MNS and the Compact.  
ii. To report on the percentage of quarterly and annual nutrition meetings 
convened. 
iii. To oversee the performance of local public employees such as 
community health workers. 
iv. To monitor nutrition activities such as vitamin A supplementation. 
v. To bring up nutrition issues in official meetings using statistics from the 
scorecards. 
vi. To identify the biggest nutrition challenges. 
vii. To share information on nutrition with other departments. 
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b. Answers from those who vaguely alluded to aspects within the MNS 
and the Compact: 
i. To plan and strategise nutrition activities. 
ii. To draw up or approve the budget for the district. 
iii. To draw up the budget for nutrition activities. 
iv. To identify places with water shortages. 
v. To borrow funds for nutrition activities. 
vi. To monitor the working capacity of the health department. 
vii. To monitor effectiveness of nutrition activities and programmes. 
viii. To distribute nutrition supplements among the population. 
ix. To plan Nutrition Day in the community. 
c. Answers from those who listed uses of the MNS and the Compact that 
have nothing to do with either of the two tools: 
i. To compare implementation of nutrition programmes between wards and 
villages. 
ii. To monitor nutrition status and outcomes in the wards and villages. 
iii. To identify women who require iron and folic acid supplementation. 
iv. To identify households with malnourished children. 
v. For planning horticultural activities such as farm trainings, plant treatment, 
buying materials for pocket gardening, etc. 
vi. For planning agricultural activities by promoting and supporting increased 
production, availability, accessibility, and consumption of diverse high-
nutrient food crops. 
vii. For planning livestock and fisheries-related activities. 
viii. For provision of loans to farmers and livestock keepers. 
ix. To educate the community on use of water to enhance nutrition. 
x. To provide individual nutrition counselling around dispensaries. 
xi. To monitor the extent of vaccination among children. 
xii. To identify areas not using iodised salt. 
xiii. To identify HIV-positive children. 
xiv. To plan awareness and other nutrition-related activities in schools. 
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xv. To present poultry data such as amount of meat, milk, and eggs that have 
been used in a quarter. 
xvi. To provide loans to women at 4 per cent interest. 
Attributes assigned incorrectly to the MNS and the Compact featured in answers 
for all ten questions in the questionnaire. Therefore, awareness of the detailed 
workings of the MNS and the Compact is low even among officials who claimed 
to be familiar with the two tools. 
4.4 Takeaway 4: Ties with community mobilisation 
and awareness 
Respondents frequently associated the MNS and the Compact with outcomes 
seemingly tied to social accountability. Officials working in various government 
levels in all five districts pointed to aspects such as social awareness and 
community engagement when answering the questions. For instance, some 
respondents claimed to have used the information from the MNS and the 
Compact to conduct awareness programmes and nutrition education in the 
community. 
He uses the MNS in implementing community activities such as 
planning of events that are focused on disseminating nutrition and 
health education to the society. 
(Village executive officer, Kishapu district) 
More than 50 respondents claimed that other officials – such as elected 
councillors and members of nutrition steering committees in the districts, wards, 
and villages – used the MNS and the Compact to engage and mobilise the 
community around nutrition: 
The elected councillors and district nutrition committees use MNS 
and Compact data for motivating community members to participate 
in different activities conducted by the district committee and at ward 
level. For example, by motivating ward members and community 
members to participate in nutrition campaigns (such as Nutrition 
Day), nutrition training and meetings, which are conducted once 
every three months. 
(District medical officer) 
When asked about the main achievements of the MNS and the Compact 
systems, respondents most commonly mentioned that the community was now 
more aware of nutrition issues: 
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The MNS has helped the community to understand the importance 
of having good nutrition and proper feeding practices. 
(Ward nursing officer, Kishapu district) 
While respondents associate community engagement around nutrition with the 
tools at hand, they did not go into detail about how the two are objectively 
connected. In contrast, a few responses, especially from Morogoro district, 
highlighted that improved community awareness on nutrition is a general trend in 
recent years, and not necessarily a result of the MNS or the Compact. We may, 
however, consider that improved community awareness or mobilisation around 
nutrition issues could be the outcome of indirect, idiosyncratic efforts by 
enterprising officials using the MNS and/or the Compact. We say ‘indirect’ 
because neither the MNS nor the Compact are specifically aimed at such 
mobilisation, and ‘idiosyncratic’ as it appears from all our evidence presented 
prior to this section that these tools are not designed for such a purpose. Even if 
this is happening widely, its modus of spreading nutrition awareness among 
citizens using scorecards through top-down processes does not equate to 
fostering social accountability. Moreover, interviews provided limited evidence 
regarding involvement of communities, CSOs or faith-based organisations in 
discussion of local nutrition issues with government officials, including through 
the formal channels of the nutrition steering committees. Some respondents 
spontaneously commented on their participation, with one noting that their views 
were not heard in nutrition steering committee meetings: 
He did not expect that their views with regard to various nutrition 
issues in the community would not be heard. Thus this is one of the 
negative experiences he has had since he became a member of the 
district nutrition steering committee. 
(Religious institutions’ representative in a district steering committee 
on nutrition) 
District nutrition steering committee meetings act as invited spaces for 
community representatives to provide their views, and while we can record 
attendance, the minutes provide no insights into the nature of discussions and 
any decisions taken in these platforms.  
4.5 Takeaway 5: Data collected do not return to 
wards and villages 
There was little in the interview answers to suggest that data collected through 
the MNS and the Compact are fed back to wards and villages for local councils 
to discuss or act upon. One possible reason for this could be the lack of vertical 
communication (between government levels) on nutrition issues – a factor 
highlighted by officials in all districts: 
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In order to ensure accountability for nutrition there should be 
cooperation and unity between low and high government levels. 
Information is truly collected but there should be feedback to where 
data were collected [from]. The feedback will help understand where 
the problem is and how they can solve the problem from top to the 
bottom level of leadership. 
(District TASAF officer) 
The only thing that needs to be improved is to have reliable 
communication from the district council to the village council. 
Sometimes, there is information cut off, which causes insufficient 
implementation of nutrition activities at the lower levels (villages). 
(District information officer) 
There is no close collaboration between district council and ward 
council, which leads to miscommunication and unfinished nutrition 
activities, particularly in the lower level. Without clear 
communication, many nutrition activities will be left unimplemented. 
(District welfare officer) 
Comments such as those, which highlight the lack of a feedback loop, suggest 
that information (in the case of the MNS and the Compact) flows in one direction 
only: upward. If the information collected from these ward and village councils to 
furnish district and regional nutrition scorecards is not relayed back to the same 
wards and villages, it inhibits the awareness of local nutrition issues, both among 
local leaders and, indirectly, to the community at large. This lack of awareness 
among local leadership and citizens represents a challenge recognised by more 
than 60 officials.  
One of the things that he did not expect from implementation of the 
MNS was the fact that the ward and village executive officers are still 
not presenting the nutrition situation information of their wards and 
villages respectively in the noticeboards of their offices. He also said 
that ‘the ward and village local government leaders are not informing 
their citizens of information they get from meetings that have nutrition 
agendas’. 
(District NGO representative) 
He said the key challenge is lack of experts that reach out to us and 
train us on nutrition matters because nutrition challenges are still 
troubling us and since we don’t even know what’s nutrition, we do 
not even understand where we should start to address these 
challenges. 
(Village executive officer, Kigoma village) 
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4.6 Takeaway 6: The missing link: accountability 
The sixth and final takeaway from the analysis of the field interviews is that the 
officials interviewed did not attach either a social accountability or a vertical 
accountability logic to the MNS and Compact systems. Although a few answers 
did include the word ‘accountability’, they did not elaborate – for instance, on 
how the scorecards within the two tools helped make officials working on 
nutrition actions more accountable for the performance of the wards and villages 
under their supervision. This suggests that officials at lower government levels 
do not regard the MNS and the Compact as accountability tools, not even in the 
manner that the policymakers drafting the country’s nutrition policies do. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
Over the past decade, and starting with the NNS in 2011, accountability has 
been given increasing attention in the Tanzanian government’s nutrition policy. 
Annual nutrition reviews at the national level (JMNRs) were constituted in 2014, 
to recommend development of a framework (CRRAF) to track the progress of 
the NNS and its successor, the NMNAP. Along the way, ‘accountability tools’ 
such as the MNS and the Compact were devised to inform the CRRAF and 
guide efforts towards NMNAP objectives. 
The national MNIS has been established to bring together and streamline the 
flow of nutrition-related information from multiple sectoral information systems, 
diverse data sources (such as national nutrition surveys) and newly instituted 
accountability tools such as the MNS and the Compact. Automation is enabling 
the use of highly organised nutrition data, faster and in significantly greater detail 
than was previously possible. By enhancing transparency of efforts by diverse 
government actors, they facilitate multisectoral coordination on nutrition issues at 
the national and subnational levels.  
Crucially, data management systems and accountability tools are devised to 
enable administrative and political oversight and control by central authorities to 
monitor and hold local government bodies accountable for nutrition activities, 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Accountability is thus mainly interpreted as 
‘vertical accountability’, largely conceived and developed in the service of a 
heavily centralised state, while the general public is kept at arm’s length. Our 
evidence shows that the MNS and the Compact, for instance, are designed to be 
strictly for internal government purposes only; none of the information collected 
quarterly and biannually from districts and regions by the MNS and Compact 
scorecards is publicly available. Moreover, data travels primarily from lower to 
higher levels of administrations, and feedback loops to inform subnational 
administrations are significantly under-developed.  
Such a closed conception of accountability does not help build a relationship 
between citizens and government ‘based on transparency, accountability and 
participation’ (Government of Tanzania 2016a: 82). The NMNAP stresses the 
need to build ‘social accountability’ where the public can hold state actors 
accountable for performance on nutrition targets, but stops short of explicitly 
laying out a roadmap to build that. Social accountability is at best a peripheral 
feature of the MNS and Compact instruments. The NMNAP’s Mid-Term Review 
in 2019 documents the fact that nothing was done to include the role of the 
community in strengthening nutrition accountability, leaving it as a 
recommendation for the next nutrition strategy to pick up (Government of 
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Tanzania 2019d: 60). As such, social accountability is clearly not a priority, as 
action on it has been deferred.  
This research effort was significantly hampered by the lack of data and limited 
detail published on the operationalisation of the MNS and the Compact. 
Consequently, questions remain about the distinctness of each tool: while the 
Compact does not share the nutrition-sensitive focus of the MNS, nutrition-
specific indicators appear to be held in common. Yet, operationalisations of 
indicators presented in published government documents lack specificity and 
precision. If the MNS and the Compact co-exist under the newly developed 
MNIS, we fail to understand the purpose served by having two synonymous 
systems with such a significant overlap of indicators. It is possible that the 
seemingly common indicators within the two tools have been operationalised 
differently, but we could not confirm this despite several engagements with 
officials in the TFNC and PO-RALG. There is hence a possibility that data on 
highly similar but not identical indicators are being collated through the MNS and 
the Compact separately – a practice that may generate confusion for 
policymakers and other stakeholders.  
Field interviews with 204 local officials across the five districts in five regions 
complemented our policy document analysis, offering insights into current 
access to and use of the MNS and the Compact at district, ward, and village 
levels. About two in three respondents claimed to be familiar with the two tools; 
those who were not familiar with them were largely concentrated at ward and 
village levels – i.e. those furthest removed from central administrative oversight. 
Several respondents cited positive outcomes of implementation of the MNS and 
the Compact, including increased involvement of political and administrative 
leaders, better vertical and horizontal coordination on nutrition between 
departments and administrations, and greater community participation in nutrition 
activities. However, these claims need to be seen against a backdrop of 
substantial confusion among respondents about the two tools, and their 
conflation with other nutrition-related tools and government 
programmes/policies.  
Respondents noted that data collected through the MNS and the Compact did 
not return to the wards and villages for local councils to discuss or act upon. 
Occasional idiosyncratic initiatives by local officials to use these tools to generate 
community awareness on nutrition matters cannot be ruled out. Importantly 
though, interviews offered scant evidence to suggest that the MNS and Compact 
scorecards are used to promote social accountability around nutrition.  
Indeed, few respondents ascribed an ‘accountability logic’ to the MNS and 
Compact systems, even though they have been labelled as ‘accountability tools’ 
in policy documents. This suggests a discrepancy in how national policymakers 
and development partners supporting government policymaking envision the 
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MNS and the Compact and how they talk about (social) accountability and 
community participation, and their conceptual and practical remoteness to local 
officials having grounded knowledge of the day-to-day functioning of government 
bureaucracy.  
To conclude, the Tanzanian government has, over the past decade, put in place 
substantial efforts to increase spending, institutionalise evidence-gathering 
mechanisms on the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of nutrition programming, 
and innovate by introducing new incentives for politico-administrative leadership 
at subnational level. These efforts are largely in the service of a centralised state, 
towards advancing vertical accountability. Significant barriers continue to inhibit 
greater accountability of the Tanzanian state towards its citizens for nutrition, and 
it is clear that social accountability is deprioritised, to hold back advances 
towards nutrition security for many of its citizens. 
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Annexe 1: From the review of policy 
documents 
The following annexes relate to the text in section 3: Vision on nutrition 
accountability expressed in nutrition documents. 
Annexe 1A: On the Compact’s operational 
structure 
Here are some examples from the Compact evaluation meeting reports, which 
demonstrate a consistent effort to place the onus of implementing the Nutrition 
Compact on the lower levels of government, thereby reflecting the Compact’s 
place and purpose in the broader picture of nutrition governance in Tanzania.  
Table A1 Excerpts from policy documents 
regarding implementation of the Compact 
Instance Appeared as Appeared in 
Regions should analyse the performance 
of Compact indicators per council, to be 
able to identify councils that are dragging 
down the performance of the respective 
regions. 








of the Compact, 
19 March 2019 
(Government of 
Tanzania 2019c) 
Due to shortage of nutrition officers in 
councils, regions should ensure that other 
experts such as Community 
Development, Social Welfare and 
Agriculture extension officers are 
capacitated to provide nutrition education 
to the community, as efforts to recruit 
nutrition experts are underway.  








of the Compact, 
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Table A1 (cont’d.) 
Instance Appeared as Appeared in 
Regions should continue to conduct 
evaluation biannually in order to track 
the performance of compact indicators 
per councils, to identify councils that 
have poor performance through the 
Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation 








of the Compact, 




He (Minister of State for PO-RALG) 
also congratulated all regional 
commissioners who have trickled down 
the Compact agreement to district 
commissioners, district executive 
directors then to ward and village/ 
street executive officers in order to 
administer the implementation of 
nutrition interventions to their levels of 
jurisdiction.  







of the Compact, 
24 August 2019 
(ibid.) 
To raise a sense of ownership on 
Nutrition Performance Compact 
Agreement evaluation at regional level. 
One of the 







All regions to ensure their councils 
commit to execute domestic fund 
allocated for nutrition interventions. 
A recommendation 







Nutrition reports should be discussed 
at council level before submission to 
PO-RALG. 
A recommendation 







Annexe 1B: On the overlap of indicators between 
the MNS and the Compact 
A 2018 draft of the MNS shared by the TFNC shows that the scorecard has 15 
‘process indicators’ spread across ten nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive 
categories, which align directly with the key result areas (KRA) of the NMNAP. 
However, as is apparent from Table 5.1, the MNS does not have a category that 
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corresponds to KRA 4 of the NMNAP (which is related to Diet Related Non-
Communicable Diseases or DRNCDs). 
Information for the 15 MNS indicators is collected quarterly at the district level, 
and collated biannually and annually, according to the TFNC. When compared to 
the indicators included in the Compact, four MNS categories are seen to overlap. 
Table A2 Similarities in indicator focus in the MNS 
and the Compact 
Multisectoral scorecard (MNS) Compact indicator 
Category Indicator 
Maternal, infant, 
young child and 
adolescent 
nutrition 
Indicator 1: Proportion of 
mothers of children aged 0–23 
months who have received 
counselling on infant and young 
child feeding (breastfeeding 
and complementary feeding) 
from a community health 
worker in the reporting period 
Indicator 4: Maternal 
infant young children and 
adolescent nutrition 
counseling [sic] provided 
at the health facilities 
Indicator 5: Nutrition 
education and counseling 






Indicator 2: Proportion of 
children aged 6–59 months who 
have received vitamin A 
supplements in the previous 6 
months 
Indicator 2: Vitamin A 
supplementation to 
children aged 6–59 
months 
Indicator 3: Proportion of 
pregnant women who received 
any iron folic acid (IFA) in the 
reporting period 









Indicator 4: Proportion of 
expected cases of severe acute 
malnutrition (SAM) among 
children aged 0-59 months who 
were admitted for treatment in 
the IMAM service in the 
reporting period 
Indicator 6: Percent of 
malnourished children 
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Table A2 (cont’d.) 





Indicator 12: Implementation 
rate of annual nutrition plan 
 
Indicator 13: Proportion of 
council budget spent on 
nutrition activities 
Indicator 1: Domestic 
fund spent by council 
Indicator 14: Status of council 
nutrition steering committee 
meetings held 
Indicator 7: Completion 




The table shows that the Compact concerns itself more with nutrition-specific 
indicators and financial resource management, while the MNS monitors nutrition-
sensitive interventions in addition to both of those areas monitored by the 
Compact. Both tools collect information from lower levels of administration: while 
the MNS includes nutrition data from districts, which are subsequently 
aggregated at the regional level, the Compact collects data from the community 
and health service providers and aggregates them at council level.  
The following is a list of MNS and Compact indicators for comparison. Scorecard 
indicators in bold (below) are understood to be common among the MNS and 
the Compact. The degree and extent of this commonality could not be confirmed 
due to lack of access to official resources on how these indicators are 
operationalised. This comparison is instead based solely on the phrasing of the 
indicators in official and internal documents of the TFNC and PO-RALG. 
MNS indicators: 
‒ Category 1: Maternal, infant, young child and adolescent nutrition 
1. Proportion of mothers of children aged 0–23 month who have 
received counselling on infant and young child feeding 
(breastfeeding and complementary feeding) from a community 
health workers in the reporting period 
‒ Category 2: Prevention and management of micronutrient deficiencies  
2. Proportion of children aged 6–59 months who have received vitamin 
A supplements in the previous six months 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper 
Nutrition Accountability through Sub-National Scorecards in Tanzania – Policy Innovations 





3. Proportion of pregnant women who received any iron folic acid (IFA) 
in the reporting period 
‒ Category 3: Integrated management of acute malnutrition 
4. Proportion of expected cases of SAM among children aged 0–59 
months who were admitted for treatment in the IMAM service in the 
reporting period 
‒ Category 4: NS – Water, sanitation and hygiene 
5. Proportion of households with improved latrines in the reporting period 
6. Proportion of households with access to clean and safe water 
7. Proportion of households with functional handwashing facilities in the 
reporting period 
‒ Category 5: NS – Food security 
8. Proportion of households with food insecurity  
‒ Category 6: NS – Education 
9. Proportion of females in secondary school enrollment 
‒ Category 7: NS – Financing 
10. Proportion of council budgets allocated funds for nutrition 
‒ Category 8: NS – Social protection 
11. Proportion of vulnerable households benefiting from social protection 
programmes (conditional cash transfers, cash for work, and nutrition 
education during community sessions) who received nutrition education in 
the reporting period 
‒ Category 9: Multisectoral nutrition governance 
12. Implementation rate of annual nutrition plan 
13. Proportion of council budget spent on nutrition activities  
14. Status of council nutrition steering committee meetings held 
‒ Category 10: Multisectoral nutrition information system 
15. Data completeness 
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Indicator 1: Domestic fund spent by council 
Indicator 2: Vitamin A supplementation to children aged 6–59 months 
Indicator 3: Iron and folic acid (FeFo) supplementation to pregnant women 
Indicator 4: Maternal infant young children and adolescent nutrition counseling 
provided at the health facilities 
Indicator 5: Nutrition education and counseling to caregivers at community 
level 
Indicator 6: Percent of malnourished children identified and received 
treatment 
Indicator 7: Completion rate of Multisectoral Nutrition Steering Committee 
meetings 
Indicator 8: Completion rate of supportive supervision conducted 
Indicator 9: Food inspection conducted in year 2019/20 
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Annexe 2: From the field interviews 
The following annexes relate to the text in section 4: The MNS and the Compact 
at subnational level: empirical evidence from interviews. 
Annexe 2A: Questionnaire for the interviews 










Role in council 
 
Date of interview 
 
Type of interview 
 
Nutrition Committee member profile: 
  
a. Access to and use of the MNS and the Compact 
1. As a member of the District Development Committee, find out what are 
his/her main roles in the council. 
2. Find out if he/she is familiar with the MNS and Compact information systems 
(what they are, and what kind of information/data they consist of.) 
3. Find out if he/she has ever made use of the information/data from the MNS 
and Compact systems. 
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4. Probe to find out the main uses of the MNS and the Nutrition Compact 
indicators/data (e.g. planning, monitoring, community engagement, etc.), and 
by whom. 
5. In what ways are the elected councillors and the District Nutrition Steering 
Committees making use of the MNS and Compact data? 
6. Probe to find out if there are some aspects of the MNS and the Compact that 
are not clear to them, or still need to be strengthened to foster social 
accountability.  
7. With respect to protecting some of the most vulnerable population groups 
such as women of reproductive age and children, find out how he/she feels 
about how the MNS/Compact is addressing these needs.  
 
What is working well and not so well in the MNS and the Compact?  
1. Find out what he/she considers to be the main achievements of the MNS and 
the Compact so far. 
2. What does he/she feel should be kept the same or slightly improved in the 
content or delivery of the MNS and the Compact? (Probe: What are the key 
challenges, what does not work well and why?) 
3. Find out if there is anything that is happening (positive and negative) from 
implementing the MNS and the Compact that he/she did not expect. 
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Annexe 2B: List of respondents 
Table A3 illustrates the extent of the field interview exercise, results of which 
have been analysed in section 4. 
Table A3 Field interview respondents in the five 
Tanzanian districts 
District District level Ward level Village level Total 
Kigoma  Nutrition officer, Nutrition 
Coordinator, Community 
Development Officer, Deputy 
District Executive Director, 
Education Officer, 
Immunisation Officer, IT 
Officer, Medical Officer, 
Health Officer, Human 
Resource Officer, Livestock 
and Fisheries Officer, 
Planning Officer, 
Reproductive and Child 





















Kishapu  Nutrition Officer, Health 
Information System Officer, 
Agriculture Officer, Christian 
Representative, Muslim 
Representative, Community 
Development Officer, Health 
Officer, District Executive 
Director, Development 
Officer, District Secretary, 
HIV-AIDS Coordinator, IT 
Officer, Livestock and 
Fisheries Officer, Medical 
Officer, Primary School 
Officer, Reproductive and 
Child Health Officer, Rural 
Water Supply Officer, Social 
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Mbeya  Nutrition Officer, Education 
Officer (secondary schools), 
Information Officer, 
Community Development 
Officer, Finance Officer, 
Horticulture Officer, Human 
Resource Officer, Medical 
Officer, Planning Officer, 
Education Officer (primary 
schools), Welfare Officer, 
Livestock Officer 
4 Ward Executive 









Officers, 2 Ward 
Councillors, 1 
Community 











Misungwi  Nutrition Officer, Agriculture 
Officer, Community 
Development Officer, Deputy 
Executive Director, Education 
Officer (primary schools), 
Education Officer (secondary 
schools), Health Officer, 
Human Resource Officer, 
Livestock and Fisheries 
Officer, Livestock Officer, 
Medical Officer, NGOs 
representative, Planning 
Officer, TASAF Officer, 





Officers, 3 Ward 
Agriculture 
Officers, 2 Ward 
Education 
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Development Officer, Council 
Committee Clerk, Education 
Officer (secondary schools), 
Health Education 
Coordinator, Human 
Resource Officer, Information 
Technology Officer, Livestock 
Officer, Medical Officer, 
NGOs Representative, 




Officers, 2 Ward 
Community 
Development 
Officers, 3 Ward 
Education 
Officers, 3 Ward 
Executive 
Officers, 3 Ward 
Livestock 
Officers, 1 Ward 
Health Officer, 1 
Ward Councillor, 
1 Ward Forestry 
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